Nigerian Air Force Escalates Anti-Terror Push with Precision Airstrikes on ISWAP Strongholds in Borno

Maiduguri, Borno State – November 10, 2025
In a decisive escalation of its nationwide campaign against terrorism and banditry, the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) has conducted a series of targeted airstrikes that eliminated scores of Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) fighters in the restive communities of Mallam Fatori and Shuwaram, located in Borno State’s Northern Tumbuns region along the Lake Chad Basin. The operations, executed on November 9 under the banners of Operation HADIN KAI in the Northeast and Operation FANSAN YAMMA in the Northwest, underscore the NAF’s commitment to disrupting terrorist networks amid ongoing threats to civilian safety and regional stability.
Air Commodore Ehimen Ejodame, Director of Public Relations and Information at NAF Headquarters in Abuja, confirmed the strikes in a statement released early Monday. “Guided by real-time Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) feeds, NAF air assets delivered precision blows southeast of Shuwaram before repositioning to Mallam Fatori,” Ejodame said. Intelligence reports had pinpointed ISWAP elements mobilizing aggressively, with fighters observed congregating on motorcycles and makeshift boats—tactics commonly used for rapid incursions across the porous Lake Chad waterways.
The Mallam Fatori and Shuwaram areas, part of Borno’s remote Tumbu islands and swamplands, have long served as logistical hubs for ISWAP, a Boko Haram splinter group affiliated with the global Islamic State network. These strikes come just days after ground troops under Operation HADIN KAI repelled a coordinated assault on Forward Operating Base Kangar in Mallam Fatori on November 4, where joint Nigerian and Nigerien forces neutralized several attackers in a fierce exchange. Follow-up aerial interdictions at the time inflicted additional casualties on fleeing militants, setting the stage for this week’s intensified air campaign.
Eyewitness accounts from local vigilantes and displaced residents in nearby Dikwa and Rann communities described the strikes as “thunderous and unrelenting,” with low-flying NAF jets—likely Alpha Jets or Super Tucanos from the 105 Composite Group—unleashing guided munitions on clustered terrorist positions. “We heard the explosions echoing across the water for hours; it’s a relief to know the Air Force is hitting them where they hide,” said one anonymous fisherman from a resettlement camp, speaking to Clarion News on condition of anonymity due to security concerns. No civilian casualties were reported, a testament to the ISR-driven precision that has become a hallmark of recent NAF operations.
This Borno-focused action forms part of a broader multi-state offensive. Concurrently, NAF aircraft struck bandit enclaves in Garin Dandi and Chigogo forests in Kwara State with “devastating accuracy,” dismantling camps used for kidnapping and arms stockpiling. In Katsina State’s Kankara Local Government Area, precision interdictions targeted the notorious Zango Hill hideout, a bandit stronghold linked to cross-border cattle rustling. Further strikes hit terrorist logistics nodes in Zamfara and Kaduna, neutralizing armed elements and destroying over a dozen improvised explosive device (IED) workshops.
The operations reflect a surge in NAF activity since early 2025, building on gains from a sweeping Borno offensive earlier this year that claimed nearly 600 militants and hundreds of vehicles. Chief of Air Staff Air Marshal Hasan Abubakar has credited enhanced ISR capabilities, including drone surveillance and satellite imagery shared with regional partners like the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), for enabling such rapid response times. “These missions degrade the enemy’s ability to regroup and launch attacks, protecting our troops and the vulnerable populations they serve,” Abubakar stated during a recent visit to Borno Governor Babagana Zulum.
ISWAP’s presence in the Lake Chad Basin has persisted despite years of multinational efforts, with the group exploiting the vast, ungoverned waterways for smuggling, recruitment, and hit-and-run raids. Recent intelligence suggests the strikes may have disrupted planned offensives during the dry season, when mobility increases. However, security analysts caution that while aerial dominance provides a tactical edge, sustained ground presence and community engagement remain essential to prevent resurgence.
The NAF’s actions align with President Bola Tinubu’s renewed security blueprint, which emphasizes integrated air-ground operations to reclaim territorial integrity. As Nigeria marks progress in its decade-long fight against insurgency—over 200 terrorist logistics hubs destroyed in the Northeast alone this year—these strikes serve as a stark reminder of the human cost and resilience required. Families in Borno continue to rebuild, with humanitarian agencies reporting improved access to aid routes following the clearances.
The Nigerian Air Force reaffirmed its vigilance, urging citizens to provide actionable tips via hotlines. “Together, we are turning the tide,” Ejodame concluded. Clarion News will continue monitoring developments in this critical theater.



The Rise and Evolution of ISWAP: A Detailed History of the Islamic State West Africa Province
The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), also known as Wilāyat Garb Ifrīqīyā in Arabic, is a Salafi-jihadist militant group operating primarily in the Lake Chad Basin region, spanning northeastern Nigeria, southeastern Niger, northern Cameroon, and western Chad. As an affiliate of the global Islamic State (IS) network, ISWAP emerged from the violent fragmentation of Boko Haram and has since become one of the most resilient and adaptive jihadist organizations in sub-Saharan Africa. Unlike its parent group, ISWAP has emphasized territorial control, governance in remote areas, and tactical sophistication, including the use of drones and armored vehicles, while avoiding the indiscriminate civilian targeting that alienated local populations from Boko Haram. This history traces ISWAP’s origins, key splits, leadership transitions, major operations, and ongoing challenges, drawing on verified timelines and events up to November 2025.
Origins in Boko Haram: The Pre-ISWAP Era (2002–2015)
ISWAP’s roots lie in the founding of Boko Haram (Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad, or JASDJ) in Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria, in 2002. Led by Mohammed Yusuf, the group initially focused on promoting a puritanical interpretation of Islam, rejecting Western education (“Boko Haram” translates to “Western education is forbidden”) and secular governance. Yusuf’s movement drew from Salafi-jihadist influences amplified in northern Nigeria during the 1980s and 1990s, fueled by Saudi-funded mosques and scholarships that exposed local Muslims to Wahhabism. By 2009, tensions escalated into an uprising against Nigerian authorities, resulting in Yusuf’s extrajudicial killing by security forces and the deaths of around 800 followers. This sparked a full-scale insurgency under his deputy, Abubakar Shekau, who vowed revenge and expanded operations into suicide bombings, kidnappings, and territorial seizures.
Under Shekau, Boko Haram’s campaign intensified, capturing towns in Borno State and declaring a “caliphate” in Gwoza in August 2014. The group’s brutality, including attacks on Muslims deemed “apostates,” alienated potential supporters and prompted a multinational military response from Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger. By early 2015, Boko Haram controlled swathes of territory but faced mounting losses, losing key bases like Gwoza just weeks after its “caliphate” declaration.b21902 Desperate for international legitimacy and resources, Shekau pledged allegiance (bay’ah) to IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi on March 7, 2015. IS accepted the pledge on March 12, rebranding Boko Haram as ISWAP and positioning it as the group’s West African “province. This affiliation brought propaganda support from IS’s media arms like Amaq Agency but little direct aid, as IS Central was focused on its core territories in Iraq and Syria.
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The 2016 Split: Doctrinal and Leadership Rifts
ISWAP’s formal existence was short-lived under Shekau’s unified command. Internal divisions, exacerbated by military pressure and Shekau’s extreme tactics—such as massacring Muslim civilians and rejecting IS Central’s directives—led to a schism. In July 2016, IS Central ousted Shekau and appointed Abu Musab al-Barnawi (son of Boko Haram founder Mohammed Yusuf) as ISWAP’s new leader. Al-Barnawi, a more pragmatic figure, advocated for selective targeting of “collaborators” while courting local Muslim support, aligning closer with Yusuf’s original vision of a West African Islamic state integrated into IS’s global caliphate.
Shekau refused to step down, retaining control of the majority of fighters and reverting to the Boko Haram name (JASDJ). The split divided the group geographically: ISWAP under al-Barnawi consolidated in the remote Lake Chad islands and Tumbu swamplands, while Shekau’s faction held the Sambisa Forest. Clashes erupted immediately, with hundreds of militants defecting to al-Barnawi’s side. ISWAP’s shura council (consultative assembly) emerged as a stabilizing force, incorporating democratic elements like consensus-based decisions, which helped manage internal tensions and expand recruitment. By late 2016, ISWAP had absorbed smaller IS-aligned factions, including the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) as a nominal sub-branch, though operational ties remained loose until 2019.

Expansion and Tactical Innovation (2017–2020)
Under al-Barnawi, ISWAP shifted from indiscriminate violence to insurgency tactics emphasizing military raids, IEDs, and governance in ungoverned spaces. The group exploited the Lake Chad Basin’s porous waterways for smuggling arms, recruits, and fuel, while imposing zakat (taxes) and Sharia courts in controlled areas to build legitimacy.Key events included:
2017–2018: ISWAP raided Nigerian bases in Baga (January 2019, killing dozens) and Monguno, seizing weapons and vehicles. It also conducted cross-border attacks in Cameroon and Chad, such as the July 2017 suicide bombing in N’Djamena, Chad, killing  U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson designated ISWAP a terrorist entity in September 2017.
2019: ISWAP integrated ISGS more closely under its umbrella, sharing media offices and claims. Al-Barnawi was reportedly captured by Nigerian forces in March and executed in 2020, leading to a leadership purge; he was succeeded by Ba Idrisa (Abdullah Ibn Umar al-Barnawi). The group innovated with up-armored suicide vehicle-borne IEDs (SVBIEDs) and drones for reconnaissance, likely influenced by IS Central via encrypted channels or Libyan fighters.Estimates placed ISWAP’s strength at 3,000–5,000 fighters, outpacing Shekau’s faction.
2020: UN Security Council listed ISWAP for ties to ISIL (Al-Qaida in Iraq). Attacks targeted aid workers and troops, including the November raid on a Nigerien base in Inates, killing 70+ soldiers (though attributed loosely to ISGS).
ISWAP’s growth was aided by regional instability, climate-driven displacement, and links to transnational crime like cattle rustling and gold smuggling.dae0a9
The Shekau Demise and Consolidation (2021–2023)
The intra-jihadist war peaked in 2021. ISWAP launched a major offensive against Shekau’s Sambisa stronghold in May, forcing him to detonate a suicide vest rather than surrender on May 19. This victory dissolved much of Boko Haram, with many fighters and even Shekau’s son, Abul Musanna, defecting to ISWAP. Al-Barnawi declared Boko Haram “dissolved,” absorbing remnants and expanding into southern Nigeria.
Post-2021, ISWAP faced its own fractures. Ba Idrisa was killed in September 2021 amid internal purges. By 2022, Sani Shuwaram emerged as a key commander after further losses to Nigerian strikes.f6cb79 ISWAP was blamed for the June 2022 Owo church attack in Ondo State, killing  In March 2022, IS Central granted autonomy to ISGS, splitting it from ISWAP’s umbrella.
Under commanders like Bakura Doro (a defected Shekau loyalist), ISWAP rebounded, launching coordinated raids on “supercamps” (consolidated Nigerian bases). By 2023, it controlled rural Borno pockets, financing operations through ransoms and resource extraction.
Recent Developments and Current Status (2024–2025)
As of November 2025, ISWAP remains IS’s most potent African affiliate, with 2,000–3,000 fighters dominating Lake Chad’s islands.It has escalated since January 2025, conducting 12+ attacks on Borno bases using drones and SVBIEDs, exposing flaws in Nigeria’s counterterrorism. Notable 2025 incidents include the June 9 Gubio village massacre (81 killed), June 13 attacks in Monguno and Nganzai (60+ dead), and precision strikes on Mallam Fatori and Shuwaram in November, neutralized by Nigerian Air Force airstrikes. ISWAP’s media output has surged, signaling possible IS Central support amid the Sahel’s terrorism epicenter status (over 50% of global deaths in 2023).
Leadership is now collective, led by a shura with figures like Malam Hamza (post-2021 governor) and zone emirs, emphasizing adaptability over hierarchy. Rivalries persist with JAS remnants under Bakura Doro, who absorbed losses and counterattacked in 2024.7efe96 ISWAP exploits grievances like poverty, corruption, and climate disruptions for recruitment, while competing with al-Qaeda affiliates like.
Challenges and Outlook
ISWAP’s endurance stems from its “sovereign subordinate” status—locally driven but globally inspired—allowing tactical evolution without IS Central’s micromanagement.However, multinational operations like Operation Hadin Kai have degraded its logistics, destroying 200+ hubs since 2023. Analysts warn that without addressing root causes—governance failures and ethnic tensions—ISWAP could expand southward or link with IS-Sahel Province.